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Measuring the long-term perception of monetary 
policy and the term structure 






This paper has two objectives. The first is to identify the long-term public 
perception of monetary policy. The second is to identify the relationship between 
this perception and long-term bond rates. For German data, the use of a two-factor 
model of the term structure results in the best forecast of long-term interest rates 
for the period between January 1975 and January 2003. It also allows us to 
introduce as the second factor the long-term perception of inflation as a 
characteristic of the behaviour of monetary authorities. 
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Rahapolitiikkaa koskevien pitkän aikavälin käsitysten 
mittaaminen ja korkojen aikarakenne 






Tällä tutkimuksella on kaksi tavoitetta. Ensimmäinen on mitata yleisön käsityksiä 
pitkällä aikavälillä harjoitettavasta rahapolitiikasta. Toinen tavoite on määrittää 
näiden käsitysten suhde pitkiin bondikorkoihin. Saksalaista aineistolla käytettäes-
sä korkojen aikarakenteen mallintaminen kahden faktorin mallilla johtaa parhai-
siin pitkien korkojen ennusteisiin tammikuusta 1975 tammikuuhun 2003 ja mah-
dollistaa myös pitkän aikavälin inflaatio-odotusten käyttämisen aikarakenteen toi-
sena faktorina. Tämä faktori luonnehtii samalla vallitsevia käsityksiä rahaviran-
omaisten käyttäytymisestä. 
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Long term interest rates play an important role in economics and ￿nance due
to their impact on real activity. Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that
forecasting their level is di¢ cult. In the same way, modelling their link to
monetary policy is not so easy even if this relationship appears crucial, as
emphasized by Goodfriend (1993) for the United States. Similarly the same
di¢ culty concerns the rational expectations hypothesis framework in which
most empirical analyses of the term structure of interest rates are conducted.
This approach postulates that long term rates are a weighted average of
current and expected future short rates plus a constant term premium. Even
if numerous studies have presented evidence against the validity of the rational
expectations theory in the past, from the start of the nineties, a growing
number of positive results have been obtained and expectations about the short
rate dynamics appear to be the main factor, but not the only one, driving the
evolution of interest rates.
Moreover, the necessity of taking into account monetary policy in the
rational expectations framework has been demonstrated in particular by the
seminal work of Mankiw and Miron (1986) for the short end of the term
structure. For the long part of the term structure, Fuhrer (1996), without
specifying any process for the perception of regime shifts by agents, has shown
that the expectations hypothesis can be accepted for the long part of the yield
curve if we allow some small and discrete changes in the coe¢ cients of the
reaction function for the Federal Reserve System. These results con￿rm the
relevance of monetary policy for the U.S. term structure analysis.
Four years after the launch of the euro in January 1999 and while the
European Central Bank (ECB) plans a review about its monetary policy
strategy, it seems interesting to study the link between monetary policy, the
long-term perception of in￿ ation and long-term interest rates. In the European
case, it is possible to use the German term structure as a benchmark. But in
this case, one feature is puzzling: how the long-term interest rates evolved in
link with the expected path of the short-term interest rate, while this latter was
under the control of the German monetary authorities until the end of 1998
(and normally depended of German macroeconomic conditions) and of the
ECB after this date (and the euro area activity and in￿ ation)? This question
is important not only on a theoretical basis but also because two features are
noteworthy for this period. The ￿rst is that we have observed a higher rate
of in￿ ation in Europe during the ￿rst years just after the launch of the euro
in January 1999. The second feature is that recent studies on the subject
conclude that euro interest rates are low relative to the levels derived from a
reaction function for the Bundesbank. For example, Faust et al (2001) conduct
a counterfactual exercise to compare the present policy of the ECB to the
past one conducted by the Bundesbank. Hence from a reaction function with
the Bundesbank parameters estimated with German series over the period
1985￿ 1998 but with the euro area series they conclude that the ECB is more
concerns on the output gap relatively to in￿ ation, in comparison to the policy
conducted by the Bundesbank in the past. Moreover, the estimates of Taylor
rules by Gerdesmeier and Ro¢ a (2003) from 1985 onward show some signs
7of structural changes in parameters around 1998. So it appears interesting
to study the impact of the founding of the ECB on the public perception
of monetary policy. In particular, the long-term perception, linked to the
credibility of the policy, seems a particularly important topic.
This study contains two objectives. The ￿rst is the identi￿cation of the
public perception of monetary policy to establish a relationship between this
perception, the behaviour of monetary authorities and some key economic
variables. The second objective is the identi￿cation of the relationship between
monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates. In particular, we are
interested by the link with long-term interest rates. From this perspective,
the works of Kozicki and Tinsley (1998, 2001a, 2001b) are interesting for two
reasons. Firstly, they show that conventional stationary and nonstationary
speci￿cations are unable to provide accurate forecasts of the short rate for
long horizon and then are not suited to be used to ￿t long term interest rates,
contrary to their own two-factor shifting endpoint representation. The idea
behind their work is that forecasts could be dominated by intrinsic properties
of the econometric speci￿cations used. Secondly they propose a theoretical
model to explain the existence of shifts in the stochastic process for the short
rate and show how these shifts are linked to movements in the perception of
monetary policy by the public. However, this demonstration is based only on
the study of the stochastic process of in￿ ation and on the hypothesis that, in
the long run, in￿ ation is a monetary phenomenon.
In the next section we outline some theoretical and empirical results about
the relationships between monetary policy, the in￿ ation target of monetary
authorities, the level of this target perceived by the public and the long term
interest rates dynamics. In section 3, we present the works of Kozicki and
Tinsley (1998, 2001a, 2001b) and we establish the interest of this model
in our framework. We also provide an illustration of the advantage of the
shifting endpoint speci￿cation in comparison to traditional stationary and
nonstationary speci￿cations when autoregressive models are used to produce
long-horizon expectations. In section 4 we propose two speci￿cations for the
long-term perception of the monetary authorities￿in￿ ation target to explain,
with the Fisher relationship, the presence of shifts in the long-term perception
of the short-term interest rate. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in section
5.
2 Monetary policy, in￿ ation target and long term
interest rates
Evans and Lewis (1995) and Crowder and Ho⁄man (1996) have shown that
the Fisherian decomposition of a nominal rate into the expected real rate and
expected in￿ ation can be accepted if one includes in this relation a marginal
tax rate ￿ on bond earnings. In this framework the Fisher relationship can be
written:
(1 ￿ ￿)rt = rrt + ￿
e
t (2.1)
8where rt; rrt et ￿e
t are the nominal interest rate, the real rate and the expected
level of in￿ ation respectively. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a), Evans and Lewis
(1995) and Crowder and Ho⁄man (1996) have proposed di⁄erent estimates of
the magnitude of the marginal tax rate for the United States. It appears that
this rate can be set between 0.20% and 0.30%. Moreover the level of this tax
seems to have fallen since the end of the eighties. But some authors con￿rm
the one-for-one movement between in￿ ation and interest rates without to take
into account any marginal tax rate ￿.
The relationship between in￿ ation and interest rates has also been
con￿rmed by numerous studies. We can summarise the results obtained in
four points. The ￿rst is that in the long run, this relationship is nonlinear.
For example, Evans and Lewis (1995) represent the in￿ ation dynamics with
a Markov process to take into account some episodic changes. More recently
and in a similar way, Lanne (2002) ￿nds, using a nonlinear bivariate mixture
autoregressive model for the United States between 1952 and 2000, the
presence of signi￿cant nonlinearities in the dynamics of nominal interest rate
and in￿ ation, while the real interest rate is stationary. Thus Lanne ￿nds
a one-for-one relationship between the nominal interest rate and in￿ ation
in the long run. For the United States and Canada, Tkacz (2002) uses
two-regime threshold models to show how an asymmetric e⁄ect of monetary
policy on in￿ ation can explains the existence of a non-linear relationship
between long-short yield spreads and in￿ ation changes.
The second result underlines the interest of a two-factor model rather than
a one factor model to represent the stochastic dynamics of interest rates. For
example, Balduzzi, Das and Foresi (1998) show the presence of a stochastic
central tendency in the dynamics of the short and long term interest rates
which explains that the level of the short rate is not the only relevant variable
to describe its conditional mean. For the United States between 1951 and
2001, King and Kurmann (2002) demonstrate the impact of this permanent
component (stochastic trend) on the long-term interest rate dynamics. On the
contrary, the spread depends more on the di⁄erence between the short rate
and this stochastic trend, which is a temporary component.
The third result links this permanent component to monetary authorities
behaviour. Recently, G￿rkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2003) show that
the change in expectations of the long-run in￿ ation rate by private agents
depend on macroeconomic and monetary surprises. Moreover, the relationship
between in￿ ation, interest rates and monetary policy has been studied for a
long time and, for example, since the seminal paper of Mankiw and Miron
(1986), a signi￿cant number of papers have studied the relationship between
monetary policy and the rational expectations theory.
The last result concerns the existence of an asymmetric information
set between private agents and monetary authorities so that the imperfect
knowledge of the former explains why they adopt a learning strategy about
monetary policy to infer the level of the long-term monetary policy target for
in￿ ation and why this process could take time and leads to some empirical
facts like the excess sensitivity of long-term interest rates to the dynamics
consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis. Hence G￿rkaynak,
Sack and Swanson (2003) show that since the mid-1997, when the Bank of
9England gained more operational independence and the long-term in￿ ation
target was known, the dynamics of the long-term forward rate was more
stable. Orphanides and Williams (2003) demonstrate also on a theoretical basis
how the observed overreaction of long-term interest rates to the short-term
interest rate could be explained by the presence of imperfect knowledge and
a perpetual learning process by agents about the structure of the economy
and the policymaker preferences. Hence, these two features increase the
sensitivity of in￿ ation expectations and of the term structure of interest rates to
temporary economic shocks. As shown by Orphanides and Williams (2002), the
imperfect knowledge is also responsible for the possible disconnection between
the public￿ s perception of in￿ ation which result from the observed behaviour
of monetary authorities, and the policy objective of the latter, while the same
policy appears e¢ cient under the rational expectations hypothesis.
The delayed response to economic shocks or to changes in monetary policy
which characterize the in￿ ation expectations and the interest rate dynamics is
also explained by the existence of this asymmetric information set between
private agents and monetary authorities. Hence, Huh and Lansing (2000)
and Erceg and Levin (2001) are two models which demonstrate how an
in￿ ation scare problem could produce a sharp increase of long-term interest
rates, as for the Volcker disin￿ ation period of the early 1980s and the 1987
in￿ ation scare episode. The sluggish decline of the in￿ ation rate following
these signi￿cant increases of long-term interest rates could then be explained
by time necessary to private agents to perceived the shift to the new level
of the long-term in￿ ation targeted by monetary authorities. From a dynamic
stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model, Andolfatto, Hendry and Moran
(2002) and Schorfheide (2003) demonstrate that the in￿ ation and interest rates
dynamics in the United States since 1960 could be characterized by a sluggish
learning process about the policymaker￿ s rule and the shocks that a⁄ect it.
3 Theoretical framework
At this level we need a model with two components and one constraint. The
constraint is the ability to take into account the nonlinearities in the in￿ ation
and the term structure dynamics, a usual empirical fact in past studies and a
possible outcome of the creation of the ECB. The ￿rst component is intended
to identify the long-term perception of monetary policy by private agents.
Here we use the long-term in￿ ation target perceived by the public from the
observed behaviour of the central bank and the Fisher relationship to link this
perception to the corresponding level of nominal interest rate. The second
component describes the relationship between the term structure of interest
rates and this long-term perception of monetary policy. In this case the rational
expectations hypothesis is the common transmission channel used. To take into
account possible shifts due to some monetary policy regime changes, we use the
shifting endpoint formulation of Kozicki and Tinsley (1998, 2001a, b). In the
rest of this section we present the two-stage approach of Kozicki and Tinsley in
a ￿rst stage. Then we explain our method to identify the second factor of the
10model, that is the public perception of the long-term in￿ ation target. Finally,
we present the rational expectations hypothesis as the transmission channel
used in this study.
3.1 The two-stage approach of Kozicki and Tinsley
The approach of Kozicki and Tinsley is based on a two-step procedure. The
￿rst stage is to identify the endpoints, or the limiting conditional expectations
of each variable of the model. The second stage is to include these endpoints
in the autoregressive model for forecasting. The use of these endpoints serves
to anchor the long term forecast of each variable of the model. Hence this
approach introduces a second factor in the model and conducts to better
forecasts than the traditional statistical models (stationary or nonstationary
models).
This approach has several advantages in comparison to Structural VARs.
First, this model doesn￿ t use identi￿cation assumptions and the sensitivity
of the results to them (see for example Evans and Marshall (1998) where
three di⁄erent empirical strategies are used). Second, it seems well suited in
the European context around the founding of the ECB due to the common
policy framework that could be de￿ned by the same information set (ie a
short term interest rate and two series for in￿ ation and economic activity),
the same goals of monetary policy but with possible shifts in the perception of
monetary policy goals or in the level of these variables. As noted by Kozicki
and Tinsley (2001b), these shifts are mapped into time-varying intercepts of
the equation. Third, the de￿nition of the endpoints is free, that is exogenous
to the equation. For example, Kozicki and Tinsley compute the in￿ ation
endpoint from the analyse of the stochastic dynamics of in￿ ation and the
nominal short rate endpoint could be obtained directly from the term structure
with a long-horizon forward rate or the in￿nite short rate of a zero-coupon yield
curve. Finally, the study of the transmission process to the term structure is
easy because on one side we have an estimate of an autoregressive model and,
on the other side, we could see, with the expectations theory, the long term
interest rates as an average of short term interest rates plus a constant term
premium.
However, the di¢ culty of this approach is that this model has not been
constructed in a ￿rst time to solve the identi￿cation problem of the public
perception of monetary policy, since the de￿nition of the endpoint is free,
but to improve long-term forecasts with shifting perceptions of long term
endpoints (or goals) of monetary policy. So, in respect to our two objectives,
the de￿nition of the endpoint should rest on a theoretical model which allows
to identify the public perception of monetary policy1.
1Otherwise we have to de￿ne additional assumptions. For example, in the VAR model of
Kozicki and Tinsley the shifting endpoint for in￿ ation is based on the stochastic process of
the observed in￿ ation, so they use the hypothesis that the in￿ ation is under the control of
monetary authorities to see this variable as the public perception of the long term in￿ ation
target of monetary authorities. But this hypothesis could eliminate the credibility problem.
113.2 Three speci￿cations for the short rate process
Kozicki and Tinsley (1998, 2001a) deal with the univariate case to study the
stochastic dynamic of the short rate. Hence, the general equation for the short



















This short rate endpoint r
(1)
t could be seen as the limiting conditional central
tendency of short rates. This variable could be subject to some shifts during
the time with the evolution of the long-term public￿ s perception of the short
rate level.
The persistence of the short rate process (3.1) could be obtained by
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where ￿rt = rt ￿ rt￿1 and







￿ can be interpreted as the speed at which the short rate reverts to its limiting
conditional forecast (in the ￿rst term of (3.3), the short rate is incorporated in
deviations from its long-run equilibrium value). Hence the persistence of the
short rate increases when ￿ approaches zero and when this value is reached, we
have a unit root process. Otherwise, a value of ￿ between (0,2) is consistent
with mean-reversion. In fact, (3.3) has the form of the ADF test where the
null hypothesis is H0: ￿ = 0 against ￿ > 02.
Three variations could be obtained from (3.3). The ￿rst is a constant
endpoint speci￿cation (stationary representation). Here, r
(1)
t￿1 is replaced by
a constant r(1). This hypothesis corresponds with most theoretical models
in ￿nance, such as Cox et al (1985). In this case, the short rate follows a
mean-reverting process toward the long-term value r(1). This latter is equal
to the sample mean of the short rate in large sample3.
2The ADF test has the form





and concerns the hypothesis H0: ￿ = 0 against ￿ < 0.
3The long-term value r(1) is de￿ned in this case by r(1) = c=￿ in reference with
parameters of the ADF test equation with a constant.
12The second representation corresponds to a moving-average speci￿cation
for the short rate, ie to nonstationary dynamics. In this case, the null
hypothesis of a unit root process is accepted and the ￿rst term in (3.3)
disappeared. This case is familiar in empirical macro￿nance and has lead to
numerous studies on nonstationary models and cointegration since the paper
of Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1988).
The third speci￿cation is a shifting endpoint speci￿cation. In this case, the
endpoint r
(1)
t￿1 could vary with the time and the components of the underlying
information set4. At this stage we have the choice between a fully speci￿ed
information set to explain the movements of the short-rate endpoint or to
limit the explanation power of the model by using only a forward rate directly
observed from the yield curve (in this case we assume that the yield curve
includes all the agents perceptions about the state of the economy and its
future path). For example, in the latter case, r
(1)
t￿1 could be obtained as the
average of short rates at a long-horizon (for example between 5 and 10 years)
or as the in￿nite short rate of a zero-coupon yield curve.
3.3 The de￿nition of the nominal interest rate endpoint
As noted before, the endpoint de￿nition in (3.3) is free. Hence, an I(0)
assumption for xt is consistent to a ￿xed endpoint, where its level is equal
to the sample mean of the series. When we have an I(1) assumption, the
endpoint is a moving average of past values observed. With a shifting endpoint
speci￿cation, we can integrate some discrete shifts. Hence Kozicki and Tinsley
obtain the endpoint for the short term interest rate from the implicit forward









where Dn and Dn0 are the duration for the 5-year and 10-year bonds and ￿n the
constant term premium for the n-year bond5. For these maturities, the yield
curve is relatively ￿ at so (3.4) gives a good approximation of the long-term
perception, at date t, of the short rate level. Another possibility to compute
b r
(1)
t is to use the three-month forward rate in 10 years obtained from their
zero-coupon curve, as in Jondeau and SØdillot (1999) for France and Germany.
For other series the same approach can be applied. For example, for stationary
series as the capacity utilization rate for manufacturing, the mean of the series
is removed, implying a ￿xed endpoint of zero (see Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b)).
For in￿ ation, the endpoint process should include some episodic shifts due to






5see for example Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz (1983). The duration is expressed for
an i-period coupon-bearing bond by Di =
￿
1 ￿ gi￿
=(1 ￿ g); i ￿ 0, where g is the discount
factor. For an i-period zero-coupon bond, we have Di = i .
13changes in the agents perception of the in￿ ation level, a common fact in the
literature on this subject.
3.4 The transmission to the term structure
The transmission to the term structure of interest rates is obtained by
the expectations theory. This hypothesis seems not to strong due to the
recent positive results obtained and by the fact that even if the expectations
hypothesis is not always statistically accepted, short rates expectations are
identi￿ed as the main factor driven the shape of the yield curve. Hence, for
zero-coupon bond yield, the long term interest rate R
(n)
t is an average of the













where ￿n;t is the term premium.
The use of the expectations theory means that monetary policy in￿ uences
bond yields through a dependence of the expected path of short term interest
rate on expected policy. In this framework, we use the short-rate equation
(3.3) to generate short rate expectations in (3.5), from the information set
available at date t. Hence, we use a weaker version of the expectations theory
than the use of ex post values of the short rate. In this case, we have from













where im is an m￿1 vector with all elements equal zero except for the ￿rst row
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Equation (3.7) is a description of the contemporaneous relationship between
bond yield and states variables. Predictions of yields consistent with the





















From (3.8) we can see that the importance of the endpoint de￿nition increases
with the forecast horizon (with the increase of i).
143.5 The forecast of the German long-term interest rates
We use the German series between 1975 and 1998 for the one-month short
rate, and the euro area series from 1999 onward. The 5 and 10-year bonds
are zero-coupon yields obtained from the Bundesbank over all the period. We
choose the German series due to the central place of the German policy in
the European Monetary System before the launch of the ECB and because
the German bond rates remain the benchmark for the long-term interest rates
in the euro area. The selection of the short-term interest rates then follows
our choice for long-term interest rates and the expectations theory. Until
1998, the German bond rates evolved in link with the expected path of the
German short-term interest rate and since 1999, their evolution depend on the
expectations about the future behaviour of the euro-area short-term interest
rate ￿xed by the ECB.
We start by showing on ￿gure 1 the evolution of the one-month interest
rate and of the 5 and 10-year bond rates. From 1975 until January 2003, we
can see that the three series follow a similar pattern even if some di⁄erences
exist, as between 1993 and 1999 where the decrease is more pronounced for
the one-month interest rate than for bond rates. Figure 2 illustrates three
measures of volatility for German long-term interest rates. The top panel
represents the year-to-year change of the 5 and 10-year interest rates and
show a sharp increase of the bond rates just after the launch of the ECB.
Nevertheless, this increase does not appear exceptional in its magnitude in
comparison to previous periods. The middle panel shows the volatility of the
bond rate over 12 months. This is computed at the date t as the standard
error of the series over the interval [t-12, t]. And the bottom panel shows
the same measure but where the series is the long-term minus the one-month
interest rates to eliminate any tendency and level impact. In the two cases,
the volatility appears relatively high during the ￿rst years after the launch of
the ECB in comparison to the nineties, particularly for the third measure but
without any excess, especially if we compare to the results obtained since 19756.
Hence this instability over nearly 30 years o⁄er an interesting framework to
analyze the impact of the short-rate process speci￿cation in the forecast of
German long-term interest rates.
We compare now the performance of the three speci￿cations for the
short rate process in the forecasting of long-term interest rates. We start by
computing the nominal interest rate shifting endpoint directly from the yield
curve from (3.4). We proceed in two stages as in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a).
First we obtain a ￿rst approximation of the endpoint b r
(1)
t by ignoring the
di⁄erent constant term premia with the hypothesis that Dn0￿n0 ￿ Dn￿n equal
to zero. Second, we proceed to a constant adjustment to equalize the mean
of the shifting endpoint estimate to the one of the short-term interest rate on
the sample. Result is shown on ￿gure 3 under the label ￿ shifting endpoint￿and
signi￿cant ￿ uctuations of b r
(1)
t appear between 1975 and 2003.
We estimate after that the short-rate equation (3.3) with 6 lags and where
a constant a0 is added for the estimate. The three endpoint speci￿cations
6These measures are also in￿ uenced by business cycles.
15based only on the term structure appear in the column 2￿ 4 in table 1. For the
stationary endpoint speci￿cation r
(1)
t￿1 is replaced by a constant r(1) which has
been also estimated. For the moving average speci￿cation, the parameter ￿ is
restricted to equal zero. b r
(1)
t is computed as describe in the previous section
for the shifting endpoint speci￿cation.
Table 1: Autotoregressive models of the short rate. 1975￿ 2003
Endpoint characterization
Constant Moving Shifting Learning Kalman ￿lter


















i 0:407 0:355 0:434 0:691 0:958
R2 0:057 0:047 0:069 0:089 0:092
RMSE 0:376 0:378 0:373 0:155 0:155
RMSE of the long-term bond rate prediction
5-year 1:586 1:874 1:265 = 0:969 0:967 1:017
10-year 2:014 2:372 1:565 = 1:128 1:120 1:094
For the constant, moving average and the ￿rst number of the shifting endpoint speci￿cations,
the RMSE of the long-term bond rate prediction concerns the period 1975:01￿ 2003:01. For
the second number of the shifting endpoint speci￿cation, the learning and kalman ￿lter
models, this statistic is computed over the period 1995:01￿ 2003:01.
Two comments could be made for the constant endpoint speci￿cation. First,
the value of ￿ falls in the range (0, 2) so this result con￿rms that the short rate
follow a mean-reverting process. Second, the implied short rate endpoint over
the sample is 5.42% (a0=￿). The nonstationary representation is estimated
under the constraint ￿ = 0. The Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) statistic
is closed to the level observed for the constant endpoint speci￿cation which
means that a unit root seems to be present in the short rate process. This is
con￿rmed with the ADF-test which has a similar form as the constant endpoint
speci￿cation of table 1. Hence, the t-statistic for ￿ in this speci￿cation, with
a value of 2.22 does no reject the null hypothesis that ￿ = 0 (the critical value
is 2.56 at a 10%-level). Results for the shifting endpoint speci￿cation con￿rms
the mean-reverting process followed by the short rate. And the highest value
of ￿ shows an increase in the convergence speed to the endpoint. Finally, the
closed values observed for the R2 and the RMSE statistics for the three models
show that the results for a one-period ahead prediction of the short rate do
not depend signi￿cantly on the speci￿cation of the endpoint.
From these results, we compute the one-period-ahead long-term interest
rate forecasts using the rational expectations theory and under the implicit
hypothesis that an autoregressive process like (3.3) is well suited to model the
16expectations of the future path of the short-term interest rate. Predictions
of the expectation component in the long-term yields consistent with the
information set available in t-1 are obtained from (3.8) where the term
premium ￿ is ￿xed to zero. The interest of the shifting endpoint representation
to forecast the 5-year and 10-year bond rates is clear on ￿gures 4 and 5. While
the forecast of the 5 and 10-year bond appears too stable with the stationary
representation and too volatile with the nonstationary representation, the
result appears better with the shifting endpoint speci￿cation. This is con￿rmed
by the last two rows of table 1 with the RMSE statistic (the ￿rst number for
the shifting endpoint speci￿cation). Hence, the di⁄erence between the actual
and the ￿tted series represents the residual or the constant term premium
(under the assumption that there is no error in the statistical representation
of the short-rate expectations). For the shifting endpoint speci￿cation, the
average value of this premium over the sample is 1.112% for the 5-year bond
rate and 1.519% for the 10-year bond rate7. In summary the shifting endpoint
speci￿cation introduces a second factor in the dynamics of interest rates and
this allows to take into account the observed nonlinearities in their observed
behaviour.
4 Two approaches to link the shifting endpoint to the
in￿ ation target perception
The issue of interest in this section is to provide a theoretical basis for the
existence of a shifting endpoint in the short rate forecasting model because,
if the advantage to use the shifting endpoint speci￿cation appears clearly in
the previous section, the use of an implicit forward rate does not help to
identify the link between this long-term perception of the future level of the
short rate and some particular economic information. A natural explanation
comes from the Fisher relationship which link the nominal interest rate to an
expected real component and an expected in￿ ation rate. Evans and Lewis
(1995), Crowder and Ho⁄man (1996), Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a) and Lanne
(2002) obtained two results. First, when anticipated shifts in the in￿ ation
process (and sometimes a marginal tax rate) are taken into account, there
exist a one-for-one long-run movements between nominal interest rates and
expected in￿ ation in the long-run. Second, innovations in the in￿ ation process
are the likely source of nonstationarity of nominal interest rates and the real
rate is not a signi￿cant source of shifts in nominal interest rates. Moreover,
Paloviita (2002) ￿nds that in￿ ation expectations are the main factor leading
the in￿ ation process in all euro area countries.
In this framework, it is possible to link movements in the the nominal rate
endpoint to the long-term level of in￿ ation and indirectly to the monetary
7Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a) estimate this constant term premia under the hypothesis
that the short rate process is homoskedastic (equation (15) in their paper). They report the
expected value of the long-term nominal interest rates (which include this constant term
premium). They obtain a value very close to our results for the magnitude of these constant
term premia (1.264% and 1.338% for the 5 and 10-year bonds respectively).
17authorities￿perceived in￿ ation target by the public. So either we consider
that it is enough to study only the in￿ ation process to obtain an estimate of
the in￿ ation endpoint or this latter should be linked to an explicit model of
monetary authorities behaviour. In the second case, that allows the in￿ ation
process to be out of the control of monetary authorities, or in a less extent, the
imperfect knowledge of private agents leaves open the possibility to observe a
disconnection between the public￿ s in￿ ation perception which result from the
observed behaviour of monetary authorities, and the policy objective of the
latter. The end of this section rests on two stages, where each time, the Fisher
relationship is used to obtain the corresponding nominal interest rate endpoint.
First the in￿ ation endpoint is obtained directly from the observed stochastic
dynamics of in￿ ation. Second, shifts in the in￿ ation endpoint process come
from the observed behaviour of the monetary authorities to introduce explicitly
two common features of the literature on the subject, that is the role of
monetary policy and the existence of an asymmetric information set between
private agents and central banks.
4.1 Long-run in￿ ation expectations and the stochastic
dynamics of in￿ ation
The previous section has documented ￿rst the interest of the shifting endpoint
speci￿cation in comparison to traditional autoregressive speci￿cation and
second, the presence of some shifts in the short-term nominal endpoint
stochastic process, or in other words, in the long-term perception of the level
of the short-term interest rates. In the appendix of this paper, we have also
applied the break point test methodology developed by Bai and Perron (1998a,
b) to see if these shifts in the long-term perception of the short-term interest
rate level go with some shifts in the in￿ ation process. The sequential estimate of
an unknown number of breaks points conclude to the presence of such changes
in the dynamics of in￿ ation. Hence, with the Fisher relationship, it could be
possible to explain the shifts in the short-term nominal endpoint stochastic
process by changes in the long-run in￿ ation expectations.
The issue of interest in this section is the public perception of the shifts
occurred in the in￿ ation stochastic process in Europe since 1975 and its
modelling. This procedure has to allow the obtaining of an in￿ ation endpoint
to built next a nominal interest rate endpoint and to forecast German
long-term interest rates. To answer to this question, we follow the works
of Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, b) and we apply a ￿ real-time￿process to detect
structural changes in in￿ ation dynamics, with di⁄erent degrees of monitoring to
introduce heterogeneity between agents. This method rests on the statistical
test developed by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and
allows to take into account the di⁄erent common features of the literature,
namely an asymmetric information set between private agents and monetary
authorities and the presence of episodic changes in the in￿ ation process.
Moreover, as emphasize by Gerberding (2001) for example, these phenomena
take into account the ￿ stickiness￿of the in￿ ation process by introducing a delay
18of time before to check for a new break in the in￿ ation dynamics. The in￿ ation
series from 1975 onward is built from the CPI series for Germany before 1999
and from the HICP series for the euro area after this date.
We use in this section the regression based approach of Kozicki and Tinsley
(2001a). The model rests on three hypothesis8. First information is asymmetric
between agents and monetary authorities so that private agents must watch
the behaviour of the central bank, or its apparent consequences, to detect
an episodic shift in the in￿ ation long-term target of monetary authorities9.
Second learning occurs in real time but agents need time to collect and analyze
information, so there exist a recognition lag between the period where the shift
occurs and the period where this shift is taken into account by private agents.
Third, the economy is composed of heterogeneous agents, more or less active
to monitor the behaviour of monetary authorities. This degree of activity is
modelled by playing with the number of periods an agent accumulate from
the last detected shift before to test again for the presence of a new structural
break in the in￿ ation process10.
Between two structural breaks, the endpoint of the in￿ ation process is
constant. Without any shift in the long-term perception of in￿ ation over
the period, the constant endpoint ￿(1) could be obtained from the following
equation in link with (3.3)





i￿￿t￿i + "t (4.1)
where the constant endpoint ￿(1) is equal to ￿(1) = c=￿.
But to take into account the presence of episodic shifts in the endpoint
level over all the period, the stochastic dynamics of the in￿ ation process ￿ is
studied from the following shifting endpoint speci￿cation where the structural
changes are taken into account through a change in the constant level c. In
this case the autoregressive model for in￿ ation is
￿￿t = c +
X
k
￿k￿ (t ￿ k) ￿ ￿￿￿t￿1 + C(L)￿￿t￿1 + at (4.2)
where C(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator and k=[k1;k2;:::] indexes periods
of change in the in￿ ation target of monetary authorities. When a new change
is detected in the constant, the binary dummy variable ￿ (x) switches from
zero to one. As in the stationary autoregressive case, the policy endpoint in
8We present only the model we use in this section. In their other paper, the aggregate
endpoint series is obtained from a stochastic discrete choice model.
9The di⁄erence between this section and the approach of the next section rests on this
point, with a model limited to the monitoring of the in￿ ation dynamics in one case and
a model where the policy target is infered from an explicit model for monetary authorities
behaviour in the other case.
10This number of periods before to control a new time the behaviour of monetary
authorities through the control of in￿ ation dynamics could be linked to the trimming
parameter ￿ in the previous section.











but in this case, episodic structural changes in the constant are allowed which
have an impact on the estimated long-term level of in￿ ation b ￿
(1)
t .
The detection of changes in the long-run policy target is obtained
by implementing an expanding-version of sequential searches for multiple
changepoints. Hence, agents start with an initial sample. They wait a
￿xed number of periods (di⁄erent between heterogeneous agents) to apply
a maximum-Wald test procedure to detect if there is a shift in the endpoint of
(4.2), as in Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994)11. This latter
statistic has been employed for example by Benati and Kapetanios (2002) to
test for the presence of multiple structural breaks at unknown points for the
in￿ ation dynamics of 18 countries and the euro zone. To detect a shift in the
endpoint of (4.2), agents start with an initial sample. Then they add a new
observation to this sample and, after the exclusion of the 5% of observations
at the two extremities of the sample, they test for a change in the constant
parameter in (4.2), the other parameters remaining constant. We then focus








We select six newsletters which de￿ne six recognition lags from one to six
years (with a regular 12-month interval between each newsletter) and this
approach is applied for each of them. Figure 8 represents two examples of
these newsletters. With the increase of the recognition lag, the delay between
a change in the in￿ ation process and a change in the perceived long-term level
of in￿ ation increases also. But no signi￿cant change is perceived since 1996 in
the policy target.
The aggregation of the di⁄erent breakpoints allowed by the model is
obtained from a regression approach which gives the distribution of each
categories of agents in the endpoint perception of the nominal interest rate
b r
(1)





i;t + "t (4.5)
where b r
(1)
t is the shifting endpoint estimate obtained directly from the term
structure with (3.4), b ￿
(1)
i is the endpoint estimated for the newsletter i and
wi are the weights of each letter i, i=1, ..., 6. The weights lie on a third-degree
11The 5% critical values are computed by these authors.
12We concentrate on the ave-Wald test version of Andrews (1993) and Andrews and
Ploberger (1994) because the Wald version of this test seems to exhibit more power than
the likelihood ratio or Lagrange multiplier versions (see Benati and Kapetanios (2002)).
20polynomial to smooth their distribution and avoid negative values. This
approach conduct to the following result
b r
(1)
t = 2:033 + 0:145 ￿ b ￿
(1)
1;t + 0:107 ￿ b ￿
(1)
2;t + 0:019 ￿ b ￿
(1)
3;t
+ 0:00001 ￿ b ￿
(1)
4;t + 0:169 ￿ b ￿
(1)
5;t + 0:646 ￿ b ￿
(1)
6;t (4.6)
The nominal endpoint is then obtained as the ￿tted value of (4.6) and is
represented on the top panel of ￿gure 3 under the label ￿ Learning endpoint￿ .
The overall dynamics of the learning endpoint is closed to the one of the shifting
endpoint computed from the yield curve, even if a time-lag exists. From (4.6)
the real interest rate estimate is the constant, that is 2.033% if we exclude
any marginal tax rate ￿ in (2.1). In the other case, the level of the tax is
de￿ned as ￿=
P6
i=1 b wi. The sum of the estimated weights equals 1.086 and this
corresponds to a tax level b ￿ of 0.079% and to a real interest rate equals to
1.872%13. The mean detection lag, computed as the product of the estimated
weights by the di⁄erent recognition lags conducts to an estimate of more than
5 years (5 years one month and 19 days). This lag could explain why the
learning endpoint does not increase since 1997 despite an increase in actual
in￿ ation14.
The forecast of the ￿ve and ten-year German bond rates from the Learning
endpoint is then obtained ￿rst from the estimate of the short-term interest
rate process (3.3) where r
(1)
t￿1 is replaced by the Learning endpoint estimate
and result appear in the ￿fth column of table 1. Parameters are very closed to
the shifting endpoint estimate. Then, the ￿ve and ten-year German bond rate
predictions are obtained as in section 3.5 from (3.8) where the term premia
￿ is ￿xed to zero. Result of this procedure is reported on the middle panel
of ￿gure 11 since 1995. The forecast is very closed to the shifting endpoint
solution. This is con￿rmed by the RMSE statistic in the last row of table 1,
where the second value for the shifting endpoint speci￿cation is similar to the
Learning endpoint speci￿cation.
4.2 Long-run in￿ ation expectations and the observed
behaviour of monetary authorities
In this section we take into account explicitly another distinctive feature of the
literature, namely the monetary policy in￿ uence on the long-term perception of
in￿ ation and on the dynamics of long-term interest rates. Hence the approach
does not rest only on the in￿ ation dynamics but on the in￿ ation level consistent
with the observed behaviour of the central bank, through the observed dynamic
of the short-term interest rate. The choice of the short-term interest rate as the
instrument of central banks is a common feature of the literature and is closely
linked to the interest rate setting described by Blinder (1998) for example:
13This value seems slightly lower to the real interest rate on the period. For example, the
di⁄erence in the sample between the one-month interest rate and the monthly in￿ ation on
an annual basis is 2.58%
14Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a) ￿nd also a mean recognition lag that exceed ￿ve years for
the US case.
21￿The central bank must adjust its nominal interest rate so as to
guide the real rate back toward its neutral setting. (...) I propose
to de￿ne the neutral interest rate as the interest rate that equates
GDP along this steady-state IS curve to potential GDP. (...) Thus
the proposed de￿nition of neutrality is oriented entirely toward the
control of in￿ ation, as seems appropriate given that price stability
is the primary long-run responsibility of any central bank. (...)
My suggestion, then, is that central banks estimate the neutral
interest rate on a regular basis (a range may make more sense than
a point estimate) and use that estimates as the ￿ zero point￿on their
monetary policy scales. Any higher interest rate constitutes ￿ tight
money￿ ; any lower rate constitutes ￿ easy money￿ . Neutrality is the
only viable policy setting for the long run￿ 15.
This method allows the estimate of the implicit level of in￿ ation and the
examination of its link with the observed in￿ ation and with the long-term
interest rates dynamics. In this framework, for a credible central bank and
with a symmetric information hypothesis, the long-run equilibrium value for
in￿ ation can be considered as the long-term in￿ ation objective pursued by
monetary authorities. But some di⁄erences could exist between the perceived
and the o¢ cial target level of in￿ ation if these conditions are not ful￿lled.
In this section, the framework allows to relax the hypothesis that in￿ ation
is under the control of monetary authorities. Hence, if the results are closed
to those obtained from the examination of the in￿ ation series alone, this will
translate a good credibility of the central bank, ie that the actual in￿ ation
process does not di⁄er to the dynamics implied by the central bank behaviour.
4.2.1 Forward looking reaction function and rolling regressions
In this section, private agents observe the behaviour of monetary authorities
through the rule followed by the central bank, where a policy rule is de￿ned
as a sequence of short term interest rates. Bom￿m and Brayton (1998) use
a similar framework to link the long-term perception of the policy target to
the policy rule. Their approach is modi￿ed by taking into account a forward
looking speci￿cation for the policy rule, in a similar fashion than in Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1998). Hence the underlying theoretical framework links the
short-term interest rate it to two elements: a target interest rate i￿
t and a
smoothing parameter ￿ to limit the ￿ uctuations of it
it = (1 ￿ ￿)i
￿
t + ￿it￿1 + "t (4.7)
The target interest rate satis￿es the equation
i
￿
t = ￿ + ￿Et(￿t+n) + ￿Et(yt) (4.8)
15Blinder (1998), p. 33￿ 35.
22where ￿t is in￿ ation, yt an activity gap measure and n the forward looking
horizon. With (4.8) in (4.7) we have
it = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿t+n + (1 ￿ ￿)￿yt + ￿it￿1 + ￿t (4.9)
Estimate of (4.9) is then conducted from
it = ￿1 + ￿2 ￿t+n + ￿3 yt + ￿4 it￿1 + ￿t (4.10)
where the forward looking horizon is ￿xed to 12 months.
In the long-run one can assume that the real rate of interest (rr￿) is known
and constant, that the equilibrium nominal rate of interest moves one-for-one
with equilibrium in￿ ation and that the unemployment gap is zero. It is further
assumed that nominal interest rates like in￿ ation rates are constant over time
(rt = rt+i = r and ￿t = ￿t+i = ￿, 8i = 1;:::;1). In this case, the implicit
target rate consistent with (4.10) is given by
￿
(1) =
￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿4)rr￿
1 ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿2
(4.11)
The corresponding endpoint perception for the short-term nominal interest
rate r
(1)
t;rf could then be obtained from the addition of ^ ￿
(1) with an hypothesis
for the level of rr￿. Estimate of (4.10) are conducted from a rolling regressions
approach with a constant ten-year window. GMM and two stages least squares
are used with six lags for each of the three exogenous variables in (4.10).
The interest rate series it is the one-month interest rate for Germany
between 1985 and 1998 and the one-month interest rate for the euro area
afterwards, as we also want to explain the behaviour of the German interest
rate. The in￿ ation and activity series are built in the same fashion. We use
mixed data, that is German data until 1998 and euro area data after that16.
This procedure implies another choice for the rescaling of the data. We do
not rescale in￿ ation series because the short-term interest rate depends on the
actual level of in￿ ation17. The CPI series is employed for Germany before 1999
and is combined either with the HICP series or with a core measure of in￿ ation
since 1999. Activity gap measures are built from the industrial production
index with an Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter (OgapHp) and with a quadratic trend
(OgapTrd) for the Output gap. The unemployment gap series (Ugap) comes
from the OECD. All these series are monthly data except for the quarterly
frequency of the unemployment gap, for which we have supposed a constant
16The question concerns the relative importance of national and euro area macroeconomic
series to determine national long term interest rates. We do not aggregate data for the euro
area from 1985 onward (with an arti￿cial euroland before 1999), as in Gerdesmeier and
Ro¢ a (2003) for example because we want to explain the dynamics of long-term German
bond rates and these latters were dependent on German macroeconomic conditions before
1999.
17This problem is limited by the convergence period across euro area before the launch of
the ECB and by the fact that German bond rates are the benchmark for European long-term
interest rates. Moreover if a signi￿cant change had occured in the level of in￿ ation after
the launch of the ECB, this would have led an increase in the short-term interest rate level.
We adopt here the position of a German investor monitoring the behaviour of monetary
authorities to forecast long-term German bond rates.
23value on the quarter. Series with and without rescaling have been employed but
the di⁄erence are minor due to limited value of ￿3 in (4.10) and the importance
of the smoothing parameter18. All these series are represented on ￿gure 9.
Di⁄erent speci￿cations have been tested concerning among others the
length of the window, the number of lags or the real rate level hypothesis
rr￿ and results are reported in the ￿rst eight rows of table 2. For all these
results, the ten-year window used means that in￿ ation target perception is
available since 1995. The Root Mean Square Error statistics is computed
between b r
(1)
t , the shifting endpoint speci￿cation obtained directly from the
term structure and r
(1)
t;rf, the short-term interest rate endpoint perception
implied by the rolling regressions19. Figure 10 reports also some estimates
of r
(1)
t;rf. Two conclusions could be drawn. First this method is not robust
to the choice of the series and to the estimation method, which explain non
plausible values for b r
(1)
t;rf observed in some cases (top panel of ￿gure 10) and
make di¢ cult any robust inference on the long-term in￿ ation expectations.
Second some estimates conduct to better result, as it is the case when core
measure of in￿ ation and the HP ￿lter method to build output gap are used
(middle panel of ￿gure 10).
Table 2: RMSE for the long-run short interest rate measures
Name Real rate Series Method RMSE
In￿ ation Activity
Frwrd1 2% HICP OgapHP GMM 2.376
Frwrd2 2,5% HICP OgapHP GMM 2.920
Frwrd3 2% HICP OgapTrd GMM 37.260
Frwrd4 2% HICP Ugap GMM 2.419
Frwrd5 2% core OgapHP GMM 2.088
Frwrd6 2,5% core OgapHP GMM 1.975
Frwrd7 2% core Ugap GMM 4.617
2SLS 2,5% core OgapHP 2SLS 1.894
Kalm1 2% HICP OgapHP Kalman 1.257
Kalm2 2% core OgapTrd Kalman 1.257
4.2.2 Kalman ￿lter
To get round these di¢ culties to estimate this unobservable variable which is
the perceived in￿ ation target followed by the European monetary authorities,
we use the Kalman ￿lter approach. This methodology has been used for
example by Laubach, Williams (2001) for the natural rate of interest, potential
output and its trend growth rate in the United States and by Lenz (2001) for
18The value of b ￿ in the rolling regressions is around 0.90 and less than 0.05 for b ￿4.
19The two measures could not be too di⁄erent if we have consistent estimates.
24the monetary policy stance in Switzerland. In this section we use the same
approach than Bom￿m and Brayton (1998)
it = ￿1it￿1 + ￿2 (￿t ￿ ￿
￿
t) + ￿3yt + ￿4yt￿1 + ￿5 (rr






t￿1 + "t (4.13)
where ￿1+￿5 = 1. et and "t are uncorrelated and follow an i.i.d. process. The
state-space representation of this model takes the form
it = x
0
t￿t + et (4.14)
with
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t (4.15)
where xt ￿ [1; it￿1; ￿t; yt; yt￿1]
0 and ￿t =
[￿5rr￿ ￿ ￿2￿￿
t; 1 ￿ ￿5; ￿2 + ￿5; ￿3; ￿4]
0. ￿t is a vector of zeroes, except
for its ￿rst element so only the in￿ ation target varies stochastically.
The long-term in￿ ation perception in this case is assumed to change when
a di⁄erence higher than 0.25 point is detected from the previous period for
￿￿
t in (4.13). The result of two speci￿cations is reported in the last two rows
of table 2 where the short interest rate endpoint is obtained by the addition
of the real interest rate to the long-term in￿ ation perception. But due to the
importance of inertia in (4.12) with a value of ￿1 closed to 0.90, modi￿cations
concerning ￿t and yt have no signi￿cative impact.
The analysis based on RMSE shows than the Kalman ￿lter methodology
allows a better approximation of the endpoint obtained from the term structure
than with rolling regressions. The reason is that this method does not conduct
to observe extreme values. The endpoint series obtained with the Kalman
￿lter and reported on the bottom panels of ￿gure 10 reveal the presence of
a learning period, which means that expectations need time to adjust to the
shifts observed in the term structure. We can also see than the perceived
in￿ ation target of the ECB, which is obtained by subtracting the real interest
rate level of 2%, exceeds the 2% level between 2001 and the start of 2002 (ie the
nominal short rate endpoint exceeds 4%). But the end of the sample coincides
with a return under the 2% level.
Figure 3 reports the three di⁄erent nominal endpoints obtained with the
Fisher. We recall that the ￿ shifting endpoint￿label concerns the endpoint
obtained directly from the term structure in section 3.5, the ￿ Learning
endpoint￿model has been estimated only from the observed in￿ ation dynamics
with equation (4.6) and the ￿ Kalman ￿lter￿ label concerns the endpoint
obtained in the previous section. We can see a close correspondence between
these three series, especially for the tendency even if some signi￿cant di⁄erences
appear punctually. Figure 11 then shows the forecast of the 5 and 10-year
German bond rate with this three endpoint measures include in (3.3) and
(3.8). The RMSE statistic of the 5 and 10-year German bond rates forecast
for the period 1995:01 to 2002-12 in the last row of table 1 con￿rms the good
ability of this speci￿cation to anticipate the level of the long-term interest rate.
255 Conclusion
This study pursued two objectives. The ￿rst was the identi￿cation of the
public perception of monetary policy to establish a relationship between this
perception, the behaviour of monetary authorities and some key economic
variables. The second objective was the identi￿cation of the relationship
between monetary policy and long-term interest rates. At the end, four main
results appear. First, the shifting endpoint speci￿cation seems well suitable to
forecast German long-term interest rates. This result is not a surprise and
con￿rms those obtained by Kozicki and Tinsley (1998, 2001a, b) and Jondeau
and SØdillot (1999). With these two factors models the risk premia appear
more stable over time and the average value is estimated between 1.1 and
1.5% for the 5 and 10-year bond rate.
Second, the use of the Bai and Perron (1998a, b) methodology to detect
structural changes in the in￿ ation stochastic process also con￿rmed the impact
of shifts in the long-term in￿ ation perception on the short-term interest rate
dynamics and on its long-term perception. From this point of view, the
increase in the level of in￿ ation between 1999 and 2002 appears signi￿cant
while remaining reasonable in an historical perspective.
Third, the short-term interest rate endpoint could be linked to the
long-term perception of in￿ ation and to the monetary authorities policy. We
obtain this result in two ways, from a model with heterogeneous agents
controlling the stochastic process of in￿ ation and from a model where the
implicit long-term perception of in￿ ation is built by inverting a reaction
function of monetary authorities. In the two cases, the Fisher relationship
is used to obtain the corresponding nominal interest rate endpoint. Moreover,
the forecast of German bond rates since 1995 using these short-term interest
rate endpoints as second factor conduct to similar results than those obtained
when this second factor is computed directly from the term structure with the
shifting endpoint speci￿cation. This con￿rms the validity of the two approaches
followed here and the importance of in￿ ation expectations and monetary policy
as factors driving the long-term interest rates dynamics.
Finally, from the Kalman ￿lter speci￿cation, the in￿ ation expectations
return under a 2% level from the middle of 2002, what seems to be an indication
of the credibility of the ECB. But this point requires more advanced works to
be validated.
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29Appendix
An ex post approach to test structural changes in the in￿ ation
dynamics
The endpoint of a stationary model is constant at a level equals to its sample
mean in large samples. Hence in this simple model, we are interested to detect
structural changes in the mean of the in￿ ation series. To do that, we proceed
as in Bai and Perron (1998b) where they study the U.S. ex-post real interest
rate dynamics. Hence, we suppose that agents detect changes in the mean of
the in￿ ation series and consider that until a new structural change is detected,
the best forecast for the long-term perception of in￿ ation is the observed mean
of the present ￿ period￿ , where a ￿ period￿is de￿ned as the time elapsed between
two structural changes in the in￿ ation process. Bai and Perron (1998a, b)
consider the general multiple linear regression framework with m breaks
￿t = x0
t￿ + z0
t￿1 + ut; t = 1; :::; T1
￿t = x0
t￿ + z0




t￿m+1 + ut; t = Tm + 1; :::; T
(A1)
where ￿t is the observed level of in￿ ation at time t and T the number of
observations. xt and zt are vectors of covariates with (p￿1) and (q￿1)
elements respectively and ￿ and ￿i are the corresponding vectors of coe¢ cients.
ut is the disturbance and the indices (T1; T2; :::; Tm), that is the break point
dates are unknown. We observe a pure structural change model only when
p=0. Hence Bai and Perron (1998b) propose a method to estimate together
the unknown regression parameters ￿ and ￿i with the break points (T1; T2;
:::; Tm). Our test about the stability of the in￿ ation process mean conducts
to choose xt = 0 and zt = f1g in (A1).
The ￿rst outcome of this procedure concerns the number of structural
breaks observed in the sample. This is done with the sequential application
of a supFT (l+1jl) test where the null hypothesis is the absence of a new
structural break. The procedure starts with a zero-break solution. Then
tests for the presence of di⁄erent subsamples are conducted from parameters
constancy tests. When a rejection of a supFT (l+1jl) test is observed for a
subsample, a break is added. The number of breaks l increases sequentially
until the test fails to reject the null hypothesis. For a model with l breaks,
the date of the estimated structural breaks (b T1; :::; b Tm) are obtained by a
global minimization of the sum of squared residuals. The presence of another
structural change is accepted if the latter sum for the (l+1) breaks solution is
signi￿cantly smaller than the sum for the l breaks solution. The critical values
are computed by Bai and Perron (1998a, b).
This method is an ex post method to detect break points and could not
be used in real time. But this gives a useful indication to detect break points
for in￿ ation in the European context. The result depends also on a trimming
parameter ￿, that is, the percentage of the sample which de￿nes the minimum
sample length. The maximum number of breaks allowed, which is not in all
30cases the maximum number of breaks observed, is bounded to 9. We model the
heterogeneity between private agents by the attention they bear to monitoring
the dynamic of in￿ ation20. Hence an active agent is subject to important costs
due to in￿ ation and accumulate less data before to test again for the presence of
a new break. The ￿ve possibilities for the trimming parameter ￿ are {.05, .10,
.15, .20, .25 }. They de￿ne ￿ve categories of agents and as many sensitivities21.
For example, we have 335 data in our sample so the minimum number of
periods accumulated before to test for a new break varies between 16 and 83
months (Integer(￿ ￿ T)).
The results of the Bai and Perron procedure for the German in￿ ation
until 1998 and for the euro area in￿ ation after this date conduct to select
a maximum of 9 structural breaks for the period and a value of .05 for the
trimming parameter ￿ (the number of breaks for the other values of ￿ are 7,
4, 3 and 2 respectively). The average value of in￿ ation which correspond is
shown on ￿gures 6 and 7. Two comments could be made. The ￿rst is that,
when we allow a large number of breaks between 1975 and 2002, we can detect
a break in the stochastic dynamics of in￿ ation after the founding of the ECB,
even if this break does not coincide with the ￿rst months of 1999 (￿gure 6). In
this case, the in￿ ation mean value in the last sample equals 2.41% and 2.36%
for 9 and 8 breaks respectively. The second conclusion is that this break is
minor in comparison to the past breaks in the German in￿ ation process from
1975 (￿gure 7). For the 5, 3 and 2-maximum breaks solutions, the mean of
the in￿ ation process after 1999 varies between 1.80% and 2.55%. Hence, in
conclusion, the Bai and Perron approach concludes on the existence of breaks
in the in￿ ation stochastic process.
20This solution corresponds to the choice of di⁄erent newsletters in Kozicki and Tinsley
(2001b).
21We use the Gauss program of Bai and Perron in this section. The other parameters
allow the moment matrix of residuals to be di⁄erent between subsamples. Results on the
number of breaks are similar with the BIC statistic and the modi￿ed Schwarz criterion of














Figure 3.  Nominal short term interest rate endpoints 





Figure 4.  Expected short rate components of 5-year bond 





Figure 5.  Expected short rate components of 10-year bond 





Figure 6.  Structural changes in the inflation mean 





Figure 7.  Structural changes in the inflation mean 





Figure 8.  Learning inflation endpoints obtained from two 










Figure 10.  Nominal short-term interest rate endpoints 





Figure 11.  Expected short rate components of 5 and 10-year 
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